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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
DAVID LESLIE FIFE, : Case No. 950256-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from the trial 
court's Judgment and Commitment entered March 20, 1995. 
R. 97-99. A copy of the Judgment and Commitment is contained in 
Addendum A. Pursuant to that Judgment and Commitment, the trial 
court committed Appellant to the Salt Lake County Jail for the 
one-year maximum sentence without giving him credit for 
presentence time he was confined at the Utah State Hospital. 
R. 89, 97-99. Appellant was released on June 9, 1995 from the 
Salt Lake County Jail after serving a one-year sentence in 
addition to the time he was held at the Utah State Hospital on a 
determination that he was incompetent to proceed. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial judge commit reversible error in refusing 
to give Appellant credit for the presentence time confined at the 
Utah State Hospital based on a determination that he was 
incompetent to stand trial in this case? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the trial court was required 
to give Appellant credit for time served at the Hospital is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Rawlincrs, 893 P.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Utah App. 1994), citing State 
v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
Appellant argued at the time the trial judge imposed 
sentence following revocation of probation that Appellant should 
be given credit for all time served, including the 257 days spent 
at the Utah State Hospital after the trial court determined that 
Appellant was incompetent to stand trial. R. 87-90, supplement 
to Agreed Statement of Record on Appeal. See Addendum B for a 
copy of the Agreed Statement of the Record on Appeal and the 
supplement to the Agreed Statement. Appellant based his argument 
on State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1987), and Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), and the legal concepts contained 
therein. See supplementation to Agreed Statement contained in 
Addendum B. 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes and constitutional 
provisions is contained in Addendum C: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1995) 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (Cum. Supp. 1994)1 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-3 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 (Cum. Supp. 1994)2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6 (Cum. Supp. 1994)3 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-8 (1995) 
Amendment V, United States Constitution 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information dated July 28, 1992, the State charged 
Defendant/Appellant David Leslie Fife with Forcible Sexual Abuse, 
a second degree felony. R. 010-011. On May 6, 1994, after 
having twice been found incompetent to proceed, Appellant entered 
a plea of guilty to Attempted Forcible Sexual Abuse, a third 
degree felony. R. 52-53, 66. 
On July 18, 1994, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402, 
the trial court sentenced Appellant on a class A misdemeanor. 
1
 This statute was modified slightly following the 
determination of incompetency in this case. Addendum C contains 
the text of the version of the statute in effect at the time of 
the determination of incompetency. 
2
 This statute was modified slightly following the 
determination of incompetency in this case. Addendum C contains 
the text of the version of the statute in effect at the time of 
the determination of incompetency. 
3
 This statute was modified slightly following the 
determination of incompetency in this case. Addendum C contains 
the text of the version of the statute in effect at the time of 
the determination of incompetency. 
3 
Pursuant to that sentence, Appellant was to serve the maximum 
possible one-year sentence at the Salt Lake County Jail, R. 66. 
The trial judge stayed the jail sentence and placed Appellant on 
probation. R. 66-7. 
On March 1, 1995, the trial judge issued an Order to Show 
Cause why probation should not be revoked or modified. R. 80. 
On March 20, 1995, the trial court issued its order revoking 
probation and refusing to give Appellant credit for 257 days 
served at the Utah State Hospital after a determination that 
Appellant was incompetent to stand trial. R. 97-99. See 
Addendum A. Defendant Fife appeals from this order. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Agreed Statement of the Record on Appeal, the 
supplementation thereto and the district court record outline the 
following facts: 
Officers arrested Appellant on the charges in the instant 
case on July 24, 1992. R. 87. Appellant was released from the 
jail on July 29, 1992, after having served five days. R. 87. 
On March 24, 1993, Appellant was rearrested and held in 
the Salt Lake County Jail without bail on the charge in the 
present case and an additional charge. R. 87. On May 17, 1993, 
the district court judge found Appellant incompetent to proceed 
and ordered that he be committed to the Utah State Hospital. 
R. 34, 87-8. The court ordered further that Appellant "be 
remanded to the custody of the County Sheriff." R. 34. On 
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May 21, 1993, Appellant was transported and committed to the Utah 
State Hospital. R. 88. 
After Appellant had served 165 days at the Utah State 
Hospital, the district court judge ordered that the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff transport Appellant from the Hospital to the 
district court on November 1, 1993. R. 36, 88. At the 
November 1, 1993 hearing, the trial judge found that Appellant 
was competent to stand trial and reinstated the no-bail hold. 
R. 37. 
On February 3, 1994, the district court judge again found 
Appellant incompetent to stand trial and ordered "that David L. 
Fife be committed to the Utah State Hospital until such time that 
[the] court finds that he is competent to proceed." R. 46, 88 
(emphasis added). The commitment was "made pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-15-6 (1993)." R. 47, 88. On February 9, 1994, 
Appellant was again transported and committed to the Utah State 
Hospital. R. 88. 
On May 4, 1994, the district court judge ordered "the 
Utah State Hospital to transport[] Defendant to the Salt Lake 
County Jail and hold him there pending hearing with Judge 
Medley." R. 50. On May 11, 1994, after being held an additional 
92 days at the Hospital, Appellant was transported back to the 
Salt Lake County Jail and held without bail. R. 88. 
On June 6, 1994, Appellant appeared before the trial 
5 
judge, who found Appellant competent to proceed. R. 53. 
Appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of 
guilty to Attempted Forcible Sexual Abuse, a third degree felony. 
R. 52-3, 88. Appellant entered his guilty plea with the 
understanding that he would "be sentenced as a Class A 
misdemeanor [pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §] 76-3-402, if not he 
can withdraw his plea of guilty." R. 54. 
On July 18, 1994, the trial judge sentenced Appellant 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 to a class A misdemeanor. 
R. 88. The trial judge sentenced Appellant to serve the maximum 
allowable twelve-month sentence at the Salt Lake County Jail, but 
stayed that jail sentence and placed Appellant on probation. 
R. 66. At that time, Appellant had been continuously held in 
either the Salt Lake County Jail or the Utah State Hospital since 
March 24, 1993. R. 87-89. 
On February 23, 1995, Appellant was arrested on a bench 
warrant issued in this case based on an allegation of probation 
violation and held without bail in the Salt Lake County Jail. R. 
88. On March 13, 1995, Appellant appeared before the trial judge 
for an order to show cause hearing. At that hearing, the trial 
judge found that Appellant had "violated the terms and conditions 
of his probation." R. 85. The judge revoked probation and 
committed Appellant for the maximum sentence of one year. The 
judge gave Appellant credit for 265 days served at the Salt Lake 
County Jail but refused to give him credit for the time in which 
he was committed to the Utah State Hospital based on 
6 
determinations that he was incompetent to stand trial. R. 85-86, 
89, 97-99. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court violated Appellant Fife's rights to equal 
protection, due process and freedom from double jeopardy when it 
refused to credit 257 days of pretrial commitment at the Utah 
State Hospital towards the maximum sentence. State v. Richards, 
740 P.2d 1314, and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, establish 
that Appellant's rights were violated by the extended 
incarceration in this case. Appellant was required to serve 257 
days longer than similarly situated criminal defendants who were 
either able to post bail or who were detained in the jail prior 
to trial. In addition, Appellant was committed to the Hospital 
for 257 uncredited days based on a lesser required standard than 
would be used for a civil commitment. Additionally, Appellant's 
rights to due process and freedom from double jeopardy were 
violated where he was required to serve 257 days beyond the 
maximum sentence; this extension beyond the maximum statutory 
sentence resulted in multiple punishment for the same offense. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT CREDIT 
TOWARD THE MAXIMUM ONE-YEAR SENTENCE FOR 257 
DAYS IN WHICH HE WAS CRIMINALLY COMMITTED TO 
THE STATE HOSPITAL BASED ON A DETERMINATION 
THAT HE WAS INCOMPETENT TO PROCEED ON THIS 
CASE. 
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The trial judge sentenced Appellant to the maximum 
allowable term of one year. R. 98. In so doing, the trial court 
gave Appellant credit for 265 days he had served on this case in 
the Salt Lake County Jail but refused to give him credit for 257 
days of pretrial commitment to the Utah State Hospital. R. 89, 
98. By refusing to credit the 257 days of pretrial commitment at 
the Utah State Hospital, the trial court violated Appellant's 
right to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the protection 
against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.4 
While there is no Utah or United States Supreme Court 
case law which explicitly requires that the trial judge give 
credit against a maximum sentence for time confined to the Utah 
State Hospital, the Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. 
Richards, 74 0 P.2d at 1314, provides guidance. In 
Richards, the Supreme Court held "that the Equal Protection 
Clause requires that credit against any sentence must be given 
for all presentence incarceration imposed on a defendant because 
4
 Because the trial court sentenced Appellant to a 
class A misdemeanor sentence with a maximum one-year sentence and 
committed him to the Salt Lake County Jail, the trial court, not 
the Board of Pardons, had jurisdiction to give Appellant the 
requested credit against his sentence. See State v. Richards, 
740 P.2d at 1315. Compare State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207, 
208-09 (Utah App. 1988) (Board of Pardons has jurisdiction to 
apply credit for time served where defendant consented to be 
committed to state prison on class A misdemeanor and statute 
gives Board authority over individuals serving time at state 
penal or correctional facilities). 
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he or she cannot post bail." Richards, 74 0 P.2d at 1317. The 
Court reasoned: 
While it is true that Richards' pretrial 
incarceration was not technically part of the 
punishment imposed for the crime committed, it 
was a loss of liberty occasioned by his having 
been charged with a crime and his inability to 
post bail. Thus, the total time he had to spend 
in jail, counting his pretrial detention, was 
greater than it otherwise would have been but for 
his economic status. 
Richards, 740 P.2d at 1316. 
The Richards court determined that Richards must be given 
credit for pretrial detention pursuant to the United States 
Supreme Court decisions in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 
S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 
395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971). Richards, 740 P.2d at 
1316. While not directly on point, Williams established that the 
State "may not imprison a person beyond the statutory maximum 
solely because of his or her indigency." Richards, 740 P.2d at 
1316, citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 241-42, 90 S.Ct. at 2022. 
Together, Williams and Tate established that "discrimination 
based on ability to pay a fine violates the Equal Protection 
Clause." Richards, 740 P.2d at 1316. 
Although not directly on point, the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, provides the 
same type of guidance to this Court in the instant case that 
Williams and Tate provided to the Richards court. In Jackson, 
the Court applied both a due process and equal protection 
analysis where the defendant, who had "little likelihood of 
9 
improvement," had been held pursuant to a criminal commitment for 
over three years. Under the equal protection analysis, the Court 
held that the use of a lower criminal commitment standard than 
that which was used for civil commitment proceedings, and 
subjecting Jackson "to a more stringent standard of release than 
those generally applicable to all others not charged with 
offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent 
institutionalization without the showing required for commitment 
or the opportunity for release afforded by [the Indiana civil 
commitment statutes] deprive petitioner of equal protection of 
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment." Jackson, 406 U.S. at 
730. 
Various courts have considered whether equal protection 
is violated where a criminal defendant is not given credit for 
pretrial time committed on a determination of incompetency, and 
held that such credit is required. See e.g. State v. Miranda, 
779 P.2d 976, 979-80 (N.M. App. 1989) (confinement in a mental 
hospital after arrest constitutes "official confinement" under 
statute designed to ensure equal treatment); Pladson v. State, 
385 N.W.2d 406, 409 (Minn. App. 1986) (credit for pretrial time 
spent in hospital for competency examination is required); 
Reanier v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949, 951 (Wash. 1974) (credit for 
pretrial detention where accused is "unable to or precluded from 
posting bail or otherwise procuring his release from confinement 
prior to trial" is required); State v. Mackley, 552 P.2d 628 
(Kan. 1976) (credit for time spent at hospital required). 
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The Macklev court reasoned: 
Under the circumstances of this case, the 
confinement at the state mental hospitals was 
tantamount to being in jail. The physical place 
of confinement is not important as the appellant 
technically continued to be in jail while held in 
custody at the hospitals. He was not free on 
bail, had no control over his place of custody 
and was never free to leave the hospitals. 
552 P.2d at 629. 
Reanier, cited favorably by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Richards, 740 P.2d at 1315, considered the equal protection 
analysis for determining whether credit for pretrial time served 
should be given for time confined in the hospital identical to 
the analysis for determining whether credit for time served 
should be given where a defendant was unable to post bail. In 
Reanier, the Washington Supreme Court consolidated four cases. 
The first case, Reanier, involved a defendant who was confined to 
the state hospital on two occasions before sentence. In two 
other cases, the defendants were unable to post bail. In the 
fourth case, the defendant was held without bail. Reanier, 517 
P.2d at 949-51. The Washington Supreme Court analyzed these 
situations identically, labelling them all as situations where 
the defendant was detained prior to trial because he was unable 
to or precluded from posting bail. The Court stated: 
Fundamental fairness and the avoidance of 
discrimination and possible multiple punishment 
dictate that an accused person, unable to or 
precluded from posting bail or otherwise 
procuring his release from confinement prior to 
trial, should, upon conviction and commitment to 
a state penal facility, be credited against a 
maximum and a mandatory minimum term with all 
time served in detention prior to trial and 
11 
sentence. Otherwise, such a person's total times 
in custody would exceed that of a defendant 
likewise sentenced but who had been able to 
obtain pretrial release. 
Reanier, 517 P.2d at 951. Hence, in reaching its decision in 
Richards. the Utah Supreme Court relied on a case which directly 
supports Appellant's position in this case. 
Under an equal protection analysis, a defendant who is 
not given credit for pretrial detention in the hospital is 
treated differently from a defendant who is detained pretrial in 
the jail. See Richards, 740 P.2d 1314. In addition, a defendant 
such as Appellant who serves more time than the statutory maximum 
sentence based on the trial judge's refusal to credit pretrial 
time spent confined at the hospital is treated differently from 
other mentally ill persons who can be committed only if certain 
higher standards are established. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 
723-25. 
The decision in Jackson clarifies that criminal 
commitment based on incompetency to proceed is part of a criminal 
prosecution and subject to equal protection and due process 
constraints on such prosecutions. The Utah Supreme Court has 
also explicitly clarified that criminal commitment proceedings 
are part of a criminal prosecution, and that absent a criminal 
prosecution, an individual with an identical mental illness might 
not be detained. In Ollerton v. Diamenti, 521 P.2d 899 (Utah 
1974), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Mr. Diamenti was not involuntarily hospitalized 
under the standards [of the civil commitment 
statute]; he was declared "insane" [footnote 
12 
omitted] and under the mandate of Section 
77-48-5, U.C.A. 1953, he was committed to the 
hospital and the criminal proceedings were 
suspended. Although insane, he will be detained 
in custody under the law to answer for his crime 
upon becoming sane. TH1is detention in the 
hospital is a consequence of his committing the 
crime; otherwise, although his mental condition 
were the same, he might not be so confined in the 
present facility. His commitment to the state 
hospital is part and parcel of the administration 
of the criminal law. His bail was exonerated 
upon commitment to the hospital [citation 
omitted], and upon being certified sane, he will 
be brought to trial. His detention is pursuant 
to the provisions of the Criminal Code . . . . 
Diamenti, 521 P.2d at 900 (emphasis added). 
A review of the criminal commitment statutes, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-15-1 et. seq. demonstrates that a criminal defendant who 
is confined to the Utah State Hospital on a determination that he 
is incompetent to proceed is "in custody" or "incarcerated" while 
so committed. Upon a determination of incompetency, a criminal 
defendant is "committed to the custody of the executive Director 
of the Department of Human Services or his designee." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-15-6(1) (emphasis added). The director or his designee 
designates "the specific placement of the defendant during the 
period of evaluation and treatment to restore competency." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-15-6(1); see Addendum C for complete text of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-15-1 and 77-15-6. 
Bail is exonerated "[w]hen a defendant awaiting trial is 
committed to a mental health facility." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-8 
(1995) ; see Addendum C for complete text of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-15-8. Hence, a criminally committed defendant does not have 
13 
the opportunity to bail out of the facility. 
In addition, the statute refers to the "release" of the 
defendant or the institution of civil commitment proceedings 
under certain circumstances after the passage of certain amounts 
of time. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(9) and 12. The use 
of the terms "release" and "custody" demonstrate that a 
criminally committed defendant is "incarcerated." The equal 
protection analysis in Richards is therefore easily extended to 
the present case. 
Appellant was confined for 257 days longer than a 
similarly situated criminal defendant who was not found 
incompetent. A competent defendant who is able to post bail 
would ultimately serve no more than the maximum sentence. A 
competent defendant who was unable to post bail would be given 
credit for time served and ultimately be held no longer than the 
maximum sentence. Hence, an inequality exists as to the maximum 
amount of time which can be served by competent and incompetent 
defendants under the same circumstances. 
In addition, Fife was held for 257 days based on the 
lesser criminal commitment standard; mentally ill persons who are 
not charged with a crime would not be held under these 
circumstances. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 730. An 
inequality therefore exists between Fife and mentally ill persons 
not criminally charged. Fife was held 257 days on the lesser 
criminal commitment standard. 
The trial judge's failure to give Appellant credit for 
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pretrial time confined at the Utah State Hospital also violates 
due process and double jeopardy provisions of the federal 
constitution. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 731. In Jackson, the 
United States Supreme Court reached its decision on both due 
process and equal protection grounds. It held on due process 
grounds that "a person charged by the State with a criminal 
offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to 
proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period 
of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial 
probability that he will attain that capacity in the near future. 
Jackson, 406 U.S. 738. Where it is determined that there is not 
a substantial likelihood that the criminal defendant will become 
competent in the foreseeable future, civil commitment proceedings 
must be instituted or the defendant released. See also Reanier, 
517 P.2d at 951 ("fundamental fairness" requires that defendant 
who is unable to obtain release prior to trial be given credit 
against his sentence). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(13) attempts to incorporate some 
of the due process concerns of Jackson and clarifies that 
criminal commitment at the Hospital cannot exceed the statutory 
maximum period of incarceration for the crime charged. It 
states: 
(13) In no event may the maximum period of 
detention under this section exceed the maximum 
period of incarceration which the defendant could 
receive if he were convicted of the charged 
offense. This subsection does not preclude 
pursuing involuntary civil commitment nor does it 
place any time limit on civil commitments. 
15 
In addition, the Fifth Amendment protection against 
double jeopardy precludes multiple punishment for a single 
offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 
23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. 
Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2204, 101 L.Ed.2d 865 
(1989); see Culp v. Bounds, 325 F.Supp. 416 (W.D.N.C. 1971); 
Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037, 1041 (4th Cir. 1976) . Pretrial 
detention for a crime which is not credited towards the ultimate 
sentence constitutes multiple punishment for a single offense. 
Durkin, 538 F.2d at 1041; State v. Wietholter, 636 P.2d 101, 102 
(Ariz. 1981). This is particularly true where the defendant is 
sentenced to the statutory maximum sentence for the crime. See 
State v. Cook, 679 P.2d 413, 414-15 (Wash. App. 1984); Reanier, 
517 P.2d at 955. In this case, the 257 days of confinement at 
the Hospital was an additional sentence which exceeded the 
maximum allowable sentence for the offense. This additional 
sentence constituted multiple punishment in violation of the 
protection against double jeopardy. 
This Court's decision in Rawlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958 
(Utah App. 1994) ("Rawlings I"), does not alter the analysis and 
conclusion that the protection against double jeopardy and 
Appellant's rights to due process and equal protection were 
violated in this case.5 
5
 Nor does this Court's decision in Ontiveros v. Utah 
Board of Pardons, Case No. 940290-CA (Utah App. 1995), impact on 
the decision in this case. In Ontiveros, this Court construed 
(continued) 
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In Rawlinas I, this Court held that the Board of Pardons, not the 
district court, generally has the authority to give an inmate 
credit for time served and that the Board's failure to give the 
inmate credit for time which was served as a condition of 
probation does not violate due process or impose double jeopardy. 
Rawlinas I, 869 P.2d at 962. The essence of the Rawlinas I 
holding is that failing to credit jail and hospital time served 
as a condition of probation does not violate due process or 
double jeopardy protections.6 
In reaching the decision in Rawlinas I, this Court 
emphasized that "[w]hen a convicted defendant accepts probation, 
he enters into an agreement with the sentencing court to comply 
with the conditions of probation as established by the court in 
exchange for not having to serve a prison sentence. 
In the present case, the trial judge committed Fife to 
the Hospital based on a finding that he was incompetent to 
proceed. Fife did not agree to being held at the Hospital as a 
condition of probation. Rather, he was confined to the Hospital 
and not allowed to bail out prior to trial. Unlike a voluntary 
agreement to serve time at a secure treatment facility as a 
condition of probation, the commitment in this case was 
5
 (continued) Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(3)(c) and held 
that the Board of Pardons has broad discretion in determining 
whether to give an inmate credit for time served while 
incarcerated in another state on another crime. Appellant was 
held in this state on this charge and raises a constitutional 
rather than statutory argument. 
6
 Rawlinas I did not apply an equal protection analysis. 
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"equivalent to time served in [jail] as punishment for committing 
a crime." Rawlinas I, 869 P.2d at 961. Because the time at 
issue was not served as a condition of probation, Rawlinqs I has 
no bearing on this case.7 
Under the circumstances of this case where the defendant 
was confined or incarcerated pretrial at the Utah State Hospital 
for 257 days, resulting in his serving 257 days beyond the 
statutory maximum allowable sentence, Appellant Fife's rights to 
due process, equal protection and freedom from double jeopardy 
were violated. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION 
This case presents an issue which has never been directly 
addressed by Utah appellate courts or the United States Supreme 
Court. Appellant is requesting that this Court apply the 
holdings of State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1987), and 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 2135 
(1972), along with other cases, and hold that a defendant who is 
criminally committed to the Utah State Hospital on a pretrial 
determination of incompetency must be given credit for time 
7
 Appellant apparently served sixteen days after 
sentencing as a condition of probation. R. 139. He was released 
from the jail to the Adult Residential Treatment Unit, an 
in-patient treatment facility. R. 64. The trial judge gave 
Appellant credit for time served on the sixteen days of jail. 
R. 98, 139-140. Appellant did not request and the trial judge 
did not order credit for time served at the Adult Residential 
Treatment Unit. There are no issues before this Court regarding 
credit for time served as a condition of probation. 
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served. Oral argument and written opinion are therefore 
warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court violated the protection against double 
jeopardy and Appellant's rights to due process and equal 
protection where it refused to give him credit for pretrial time 
confined to the Utah State Hospital after a determination that he 
was incompetent to proceed. Appellant requests that this Court 
reverse the portion of the trial court's order refusing to credit 
such time and remand the case to the trial court for imposition 
of a correct sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /3tt day of July, 1995. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, this /3tL day of July, 1995. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED this day of July, 1995. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
FILED 
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^ 
In the District Court of the Thircf J 
in and for Salt Lake County,. S 
* . 
JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT 
State of Utah, 
vs. 
David Leslie Fife 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 921901311 
Attempted Forcible Sexual 
Abuse 
Count I 
A Class A Misdemeanor 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
July 18, 1994 
This being the time fixed for passing of sentence upon the above named defendant, 
said defendant appearing in person and being represented by Roger Scowcroft, as Counsel, 
the State being represented by Ruth McCloskey, as Counsel. The defendant is now asked if 
he has any legal cause to show why sentence should not be passed upon him in accordance 
with section 77-35-9 U.C.A. The defendant answering he has none, therefore, judgment and 
sentence is pronounced as follows: 
C0DH7 
It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that you, David Leslie Fife, be 
confined and imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail for a term of twelve 
months. As provided by law for the crime of attempted forcible sexual abuse, a 
Class A Misdemeanor. 
The defendant is granted a stay of the above imposed sentence and placed on 
probation in the custody of the Court and under the supervision of the A.P.P.D. for the 
period of twenty-four (24) months, pursuant to the conditions listed in the file 
March 13, 1995 
The State's order to show cause hearing comes now before the Court for disposition. 
The defendant appears in person and is represented by Roger Scowcroft as Counsel, The 
State being represented by James Cope as Counsel. Based on the representations of Counsel 
for the Defense and Counsel for the State, the Court finds that the defendant has violated the 
terms of his probation and the same is revoked. The Court orders the defendant committed 
to the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with the sentence heretofore imposed. The Court 
further orders the defendant is to receive 265 days credit for time served. Commitment is to 
issue forthwith. 
You, Aaron D. Kennard, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah, are hereby commanded 
to take the said David Leslie Fife and deliver him without delay to the Salt Lake County Jail, 
then and there to be confined in accordance with the commitment heretofore imposed. 
C0098 
Issued: March 16, 1995, 
Honoii&jble Tyrone E. Medley 
Deputy Clerk 
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ADDENDUM B 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, #5141 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
FILED 
* ! C "** P ' f* T f^ltDT 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID LESLIE FIFE, 
Defendant. 
AGREED STATEMENT OF 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL 
Case No. 921901311 
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
COMES NOW Defendant, DAVID LESLIE FIFE, by and through 
counsel, ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, pursuant to Rule 11(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and submits the following Agreed 
Statement of the Record on Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 24, 1992, Defendant was arrested on report of the 
conduct alleged in this case and held without bail in the Salt Lake 
County Jail. On July 29, Defendant was released from jail having 
served 5 days (Salt Lake County Jail records appended hereto). 
On March 24, 1993, Defendant was again arrested on this and 
on another charge and held without bail in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. On May 17, Defendant was adjudged incompetent to stand trial 
00087 
in this case. On May 21, Defendant was committed and transported to 
the Utah State Hospital by Order of the Third District Court in this 
case, having served 58 days in jail. 
On November 1, 1993, Defendant was transported back to the 
Salt Lake County Jail and held without bail, having served 165 days 
at the Utah State Hospital. On February 3, 1994, Defendant was 
again adjudged incompetent to stand trial in this case. On 
February 9, Defendant was again committed and transported to Utah 
State Hospital by Order of the Third District Court in this case, 
having served 100 days in jail. 
On May 11, 1994, Defendant was transported back to the Salt 
Lake County Jail and held without bail, having served 92 days at 
Utah State Hospital. On June 6, 1994, Defendant entered a plea of 
guilty to Attempted Forcible Sexual Abuse, a third-degree felony, 
having been adjudged competent to stand trial in the Third District 
Court. On July 18, 1994, Defendant was sentenced as a class A 
misdemeanor pursuant to the provision of § 76-3-402(1), Utah Code 
Ann. (1992), on motion of Defendant and stipulation of Plaintiff. 
Defendant was placed on probation and, on August 3, 1994, was 
released from jail, having served 84 days. 
On February 23, 1995, Defendant was arrested on a bench 
warrant issued by the Third District Court on this case on 
allegation of probation violation, and held without bail in the Salt 
Lake County Jail. On March 6, Defendant admitted in open court that 
he had violated the previously imposed terms of probation. On 
March 13, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley revoked Defendant's 
- 2 - C0088 
probation and ordered Defendant to serve the previously imposed 
sentence of twelve months in jail. The court granted Defendant 
credit for all 265 days previously served in jail in this case, but 
denied Defendant credit toward the sentence of incarceration for the 
257 days served at Utah State Hospital pending the court's finding 
of Defendant's competency to stand trial. 
DATED this /t£> day of March, 1995. 
CL ~^rr^)c^ 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant 
STIPULATION 
I, JAMES M. COPE, hereby stipulate to the accuracy of the 
foregoing statement of facts. 
DATED this day of March, 1995. 
JAMES M. COPE 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
- 3 -
C0089 
ORDER 
Based upon agreement of the parties, 
IT IS ORDERED THAT the above agreed statement of facts is 
hereby approved as the record on appeal. In addition to the above 
Agreed Statement of the Record on Appeal, the clerk shall submit all 
of the papers filed in this Court. The agreed statement of facts 
and pleadings file from this Court shall comprise the record on 
appeal. 
DATED this day of March, 1995. 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, hereby certify that I have caused to 
be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the District Attorney's 
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this /£? 
day of March, 1995. 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
DELIVERED this day of March, 199, 
MAK l C 1SS5 
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Third Judicial District 
JOAN C. WATT, #3967 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, #5141 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
MAY 1 6 1995 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Ci** 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID LESLIE FIFE, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
MOTION, STIPULATION AND 
ORDER TO SUPPLEMENT AGREED 
STATEMENT OF THE RECORD 
ON APPEAL 
Case No. 921901311 
Court of Appeals 950256-CA 
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant, DAVID LESLIE FIFE, by and 
through counsel of record, JOAN C. WATT and ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, 
and moves the Court to supplement the Agreed Statement of the 
Record on Appeal which was signed by the trial judge on April 6, 
1995 with the following: 
1. On March 13, 1995, counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
David Fife argued that the trial judge should give Defendant Fife 
credit for all time he had served on the charge in this case. 
Counsel for Defendant argued that such credit for time served 
should include the time spent at the Utah State Hospital during 
the competency proceedings. The time spent at the Utah State 
Hospital was 257 days, as set forth in the Agreed Statement of 
the Record on Appeal. 
2. Defendant/Appellant Fife based his argument that he 
should be given credit for time served at the Utah State Hospital 
on State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1987), and Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, 446 (1972), and the legal 
concepts contained therein, as set forth more fully in 
Defendant's Application for Certificate of Probable Cause found 
at R. 100-105 of the District Court file in the instant case. 
3. The trial judge refused to give Defendant/Appellant 
Fife credit for the 257 days spent at the Utah State Hospital. 
DATED this // day of May, 1995. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney f o r D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT^^ J 
Attorney f o r Defe i^far^/Appe l lant 
STIPULATION 
I, JAMES M. COPE, have read the foregoing motion and 
stipulate to supplementation of the Agreed Statement of the 
Record on Appeal as set forth therein. 
DATED this )]P* of May, 1995. 
7K 
SS M. COPE 
5eputy District Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon motion of Appellant and stipulation of counsel 
and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Statement of the 
Record on Appeal which was signed April 6, 1995 be supplemented 
as set forth in the motion above. 
DATED this 'r day of May, 1995. 
BY THE COURT:-
E. MEDLEY 
i r i c t Court Judge 
riMATTHBSATNUil 
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ADDENDUM C 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense 
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being 
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant 
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the 
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
77-15-2. "Incompetent to proceed" defined. 
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is incompetent to proceed if he is 
suffering from a mental disorder or mental retardation resulting either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understand-
ing. 
77-15-3. Petition for inquiry as to defendant or prisoner 
— Filing — Contents. 
(1) Whenever a person charged with a public offense or serving a sentence 
of imprisonment is or becomes incompetent to proceed, as defined in this 
chapter, a petition may be filed in the district court of the county where the 
charge is pending or where the person is confined. 
(2) (a) The petition shall contain a certificate that it is filed in good faith 
and on reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent to 
proceed. The petition shall contain a recital of the facts, observations, and 
conversations with the defendant that have formed the basis for the 
petition. If filed by defense counsel, the petition shall contain such 
information without invading the lawyer-client privilege. 
(b) The petition may be based upon knowledge or information and belief 
and may be filed by the party alleged incompetent to proceed, any person 
acting on his behalf, the prosecuting attorney, or any person having 
custody or supervision over the person. 
77-15-5. Order for hearing — Stay of other proceedings — 
Examinations of defendant — Scope of examina-
tion and report. 
(1) When a petition is filed pursuant to Section 77-15-3 raising the issue of 
the defendant's competency to stand trial or when the court raises the issue of 
the defendant's competency pursuant to Section 77-15-4, the court in which 
proceedings are pending shall stay all proceedings. If the proceedings are in a 
court other than the district court in which the petition is filed, the district 
court shall notify that court of the filing of the petition. The district court in 
which the petition is filed shall pass upon the sufficiency of the allegations of 
incompetency. If a petition is opposed by either party, the court shall, prior to 
granting or denying the petition, hold a limited hearing solely for the purpose 
of determining the sufficiency of the petition. If the court finds that the 
allegations of incompetency raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's 
competency to stand trial, it shall enter an order for a hearing on the mental 
condition of the person who is the subject of the petition. 
(2) (a) After the granting of a petition and prior to a full competency 
hearing, the court may order the Department of Human Services to 
examine the person and to report to the court concerning the defendant's 
mental condition. 
(b) The defendant shall be examined by at least two mental health 
experts not involved in the current treatment of the defendant. 
(c) If the issue is sufficiently raised in the petition or if it becomes 
apparent that the defendant may be incompetent due to mental retarda-
tion, at least one expert experienced in mental retardation assessment 
shall evaluate the defendant. Upon appointment of the experts, the 
petitioner or other party as directed by the court shall provide information 
and materials to the examiners relevant to a determination of the 
defendant's competency and shall provide copies of the charging docu-
ment, arrest or incident reports pertaining to the charged offense, known 
criminal history information, and known prior mental health evaluations 
and treatments. 
(d) The court may make the necessary orders to provide the information 
listed in Subsection (c) to the examiners. 
(3) During the examination under Subsection (2), unless the court or the 
executive director of the department directs otherwise, the defendant shall be 
retained in the same custody or status he was in at the time the examination 
was ordered. 
(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their examination and in their report 
to the court consider and address, in addition to any other factors determined 
to be relevant by the experts: 
(a) the defendant's present capacity to: 
(i) comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations against 
him; 
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; 
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of possible 
penalties, if applicable, that may be imposed in the proceedings 
against him; 
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; 
(v) understand the adversary nature of the proceedings against 
him; 
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and 
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable; 
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on 
the nature and quality of the defendant's relationship with counsel; 
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently being administered: 
(i) whether the medication is necessary to maintain the defendant's 
competency; and 
(ii) the effect of the medication, if any, on the defendant's demeanor 
and affect and ability to participate in the proceedings. 
(5) If the expert's opinion is that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, 
the expert shall indicate in the report: 
(a) which of the above factors contributes to the defendant's incompe-
tency; 
(b) the nature of the defendant's mental disorder or mental retardation 
and its relationship to the factors contributing to the defendant's incom-
petency; 
(c) the treatment or treatments appropriate and available; and 
(d) the defendant's capacity to give informed consent to treatment to 
restore competency. 
(6) The experts examining the defendant shall provide an initial report to 
the court and the prosecuting and defense attorneys within 30 days of the 
receipt of the court's order. The report shall inform the court of the examiner's 
opinion concerning the competency of the defendant to stand trial, or, in the 
alternative, the examiner may inform the court in writing that additional time 
is needed to complete the report. If the examiner informs the court that 
additional time is needed, the examiner shall have up to an additional 30 days 
to provide the report to the court and counsel. The examiner must provide the 
report within 60 days from the receipt of the court's order unless, for good 
cause shown, the court authorizes an additional period of time to complete the 
examination and provide the report. 
(7) Any written report submitted by the experts shall: 
(a) identify the specific matters referred for evaluation; 
(b) describe the procedures, techniques, and tests used in the examina-
tion and the purpose or purposes for each; 
(c) state the expert's clinical observations, findings, and opinions on 
each issue referred for examination by the court, and indicate specifically 
those issues, if any, on which the expert could not give an opinion; and 
(d) identify the sources of information used by the expert and present 
the basis for the expert's clinical findings and opinions. 
(8) (a) Any statement made by the defendant in the course of any compe-
tency examination, whether the examination is with or without the 
consent of the defendant, any testimony by the expert based upon such 
statement, and any other fruits of the statement may not be admitted in 
evidence against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an 
issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced 
evidence. The evidence may be admitted, however, where relevant to a 
determination of the defendant's competency. 
(b) Prior to examining the defendant, examiners should specifically 
advise the defendant of the limits of confidentiality as provided under this 
subsection. 
(9) When the report is received the court shall set a date for a mental 
hearing which shall be held in not less than five and not more than 15 days, 
unless the court enlarges the time for good cause. The hearing shall be 
conducted according to the procedures outlined in Subsections 62 A-12-
234(9)(b) through (9)(f). Any person or organization directed by the depart-
ment to conduct the examination may be subpoenaed to testify at the hearing. 
If the experts are in conflict as to the competency of the defendant, all experts 
should be called to testify at the hearing if reasonably available. The court may 
call any examiner to testify at the hearing who is not called by the parties. If 
the court calls an examiner, counsel for the parties may cross-examine the 
expert. 
(10) A person shall be presumed competent unless the court, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, finds the person incompetent to proceed. The burden 
of proof is upon the proponent of incompetency at the hearing. An adjudication 
of incompetency to proceed shall not operate as an adjudication of incompe-
tency to give informed consent for medical treatment or for any other purpose, 
unless specifically set forth in the court order. 
(11) (a) Ifthe court finds the defendant incompetent to stand trial, its order 
shall contain findings addressing each of the factors in Subsections 
77-15-5 (4)(a) and (b). The order issued pursuant to Subsection 77-15-6(1) 
which the court sends to the facility where the defendant is committed or 
to the person who is responsible for assessing his progress toward 
competency shall be provided contemporaneously with the transportation 
and commitment order of the defendant, unless exigent circumstances 
require earlier commitment in which case the court shall forward the 
order within five working days of the order of transportation and commit-
ment of the defendant. 
(b) The order finding the defendant incompetent to stand trial shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) copies of the reports of the experts filed with the court pursuant 
to the order of examination if not provided previously; 
(ii) copies of any of the psychiatric, psychological, or social work 
reports submitted to the court relative to the mental condition of the 
defendant; 
(iii) any other documents made available to the court by either the 
defense or the prosecution, pertaining to the defendant's current or 
past mental condition. 
(12) Ifthe court finds it necessary to order the defendant transported prior 
to the completion of findings and compilation of documents required under 
Subsection (11), the transportation and commitment order delivering the 
defendant to the Utah State Hospital, or other mental health facility as 
directed by the executive director of the Department of Human Services or his 
designee, shall indicate that the defendant's commitment is based upon a 
finding of incompetency, and the mental health facility's copy of the order shall 
be accompanied by the reports of any experts filed with the court pursuant to 
the order of examination. The executive director of the Department of Human 
Services or his designee may refuse to accept a defendant as a patient unless 
he is accompanied by a transportation and commitment order which is 
accompanied by the reports. 
(13) Upon a finding of incompetency to stand trial by the court, the 
prosecuting and defense attorneys shall provide information and materials 
relevant to the defendant's competency to the facility where the defendant is 
committed or to the person responsible for assessing his progress towards 
competency. In addition to any other materials, the prosecuting attorney shall 
provide: 
(a) copies of the charging document and supporting affidavits or other 
documents used in the determination of probable cause; 
(b) arrest or incident reports prepared by a law enforcement agency 
pertaining to the charged offense; 
(c) information concerning the defendant's known criminal history. 
(14) The court may make any reasonable order to insure compliance with 
this section. 
(15) Failure to comply with this section shall not result in the dismissal of 
criminal charges. 
77-15-6. Commitment on finding of incompetency to 
stand trial — Subsequent hearings — Notice to 
prosecuting attorneys. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (5), if after hearing, the person is found 
to be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant committed 
to the custody of the executive director of the Department of Human Services 
or his designee for the purpose of treatment intended to restore the defendant 
to competency. The court may recommend but not order placement of the 
defendant. The court may, however, order that the defendant be placed in a 
secure setting rather than a nonsecure setting. The director or his designee 
shall designate the specific placement of the defendant during the period of 
evaluation and treatment to restore competency. 
(2) The examiner or examiners designated by the executive director to 
assess the defendant's progress toward competency may not be involved in the 
routine treatment of the defendant. The examiner or examiners shall provide 
a full report to the court and prosecuting and defense attorneys within 90 days 
of receipt of the court's order. If any examiner is unable to complete the 
assessment within 90 days, that examiner shall provide to the court and 
counsel a summary progress report which informs the court that additional 
time is necessary to complete the assessment, in which case the examiner shall 
have up to an additional 90 days to provide the full report. The full report shall 
assess: 
(a) the facility's or program's capacity to provide appropriate treatment 
for the defendant; 
(b) the nature of treatments provided to the defendant; 
(c) what progress toward competency restoration has been made with 
respect to the factors identified by the court in its initial order; 
(d) the defendant's current level of mental disorder or mental retarda-
tion and need for treatment, if any; and 
(e) the likelihood of restoration of competency and the amount of time 
estimated to achieve it. 
(3) The court on its own motion or upon motion by either party or by the 
executive director may appoint additional mental health examiners to examine 
the defendant and advise the court on his current mental status and progress 
toward competency restoration. 
(4) Upon receipt of the full report, the court shall hold a hearing to 
determine the defendant's current status. At the hearing, the burden of 
proving that the defendant is competent is on the proponent of competency. 
Following the hearing, the court shall determine by a preponderance of 
evidence whether the defendant is: 
(a) competent to stand trial; 
(b) incompetent to stand trial with a substantial probability that the 
defendant may become competent in the foreseeable future; or 
(c) incompetent to stand trial without a substantial probability that the 
defendant may become competent in the foreseeable ftiture. 
(5) (a) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), the court 
shall proceed with the trial or such other procedures as may be necessary 
to adjudicate the charges. 
(b) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection (4)(b), the court 
may order that the defendant remain committed to the custody of the 
executive director of the Department of Human Services or his designee 
for the purpose of treatment intended to restore the defendant to compe-
tency. 
(c) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection (4)(c), the court 
shall order the defendant released from the custody of the director unless 
the prosecutor informs the court that commitment proceedings pursuant 
to Title 62A, Chapter 12, Mental Health, or Title 62A, Chapter 5, Services 
to People with Disabilities, will be initiated. These commitment proceed-
ings must be initiated within seven days after the court's order entering 
the finding in Subsection (4)(c), unless the court enlarges the time for good 
cause shown. The defendant may be ordered to remain in the custody of 
the director until commitment proceedings have been concluded. If the 
defendant is committed, the court which entered the order pursuant to 
Subsection (4)(c), shall be notified by the director at least ten days prior to 
any release of the committed person. 
(6) If the defendant is recommitted to the department pursuant to Subsec-
tion (5)(b), the court shall hold a hearing one year following the recommitment. 
(7) At the hearing held pursuant to Subsection (6), except for defendants 
charged with the crimes listed in Subsection (8), a defendant who has not been 
restored to competency shall be ordered released or temporarily detained 
pending civil commitment proceedings under the same terms as provided in 
Subsection (5)(c). 
(8) If the defendant has been charged with aggravated murder, murder, 
attempted murder, manslaughter, or a first degree felony and the court 
determines that the defendant is making reasonable progress towards resto-
ration of competency at the time of the hearing held pursuant to Subsection (6), 
the court may order the defendant recommitted for a period not to exceed 18 
months for the purpose of treatment to restore the defendant to competency 
with a mandatory review hearing at the end of the 18-month period. 
(9) Except for defendants charged with aggravated murder or murder, a 
defendant who has not been restored to competency at the time of the hearing 
held pursuant to Subsection (8) shall be ordered released or temporarily 
detained pending civil commitment proceedings under the same terms as 
provided in Subsection (5)(c). 
(10) If the defendant has been charged with aggravated murder or murder 
and the court determines that he is making reasonable progress towards 
restoration of competency at the time of the mandatory review hearing held 
pursuant to Subsection (8), the court may order the defendant recommitted for 
a period not to exceed 36 months for the purpose of treatment to restore him 
to competency. 
(11) If the defendant is recommitted to the department pursuant to Subsec-
tion (10), the court shall hold a hearing no later than at 18-month intervals 
following the recommitment for the purpose of determining the defendant's 
competency status. 
(12) A defendant who has not been restored to competency at the expiration 
of the additional 36-month commitment period ordered pursuant to Subsection 
(10) shall be ordered released or temporarily detained pending civil commit-
ment proceedings under the same terms as provided in Subsection (5)(c). 
(13) In no event may the maximum period of detention under this section 
exceed the maximum period of incarceration which the defendant could receive 
if he were convicted of the charged offense. This subsection does not preclude 
pursuing involuntary civil commitment nor does it place any time limit on civil 
commitments. 
(14) Neither release from a pretrial incompetency commitment under the 
provisions of this section nor civil commitment requires dismissal of criminal 
charges. The court may retain jurisdiction over the criminal case and may 
order periodic reviews to assess the defendant's competency to stand trial. 
(15) A defendant who is civilly committed pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 12, 
Mental Health, or Title 62A, Chapter 5, Services to People with Disabilities, 
may still be adjudicated competent to stand trial under this chapter. 
(16) (a) The remedy for a violation of the time periods specified in this 
section, other than those specified in Subsection (5)(c), (7), (9), (12), or (13), 
shall be a motion to compel the hearing, or mandamus, but not release 
from detention or dismissal of the criminal charges. 
(b) The remedy for a violation of the time periods specified in Subsec-
tion (5)(c), (7), (9), (12), or (13) shall not be dismissal of the criminal 
charges. 
(17) In cases in which the treatment of the defendant is precluded by court 
order for a period of time, that time period may not be considered in computing 
time limitations under this section. 
(18) At any time that the defendant becomes competent to stand trial, the 
clinical director of the hospital or other facility or the executive director of the 
Department of Human Services shall certify that fact to the court. The court 
shall conduct a hearing within 15 working days of the receipt of the clinical 
director's or executive director's report, unless the court enlarges the time for 
good cause. 
(19) The court may order a hearing or rehearing at any time on its own 
motion or upon recommendations of the clinical director of the hospital or other 
facility or the executive director of the Department of Human Services. 
(20) Notice of a hearing on competency to stand trial shall be given to the 
prosecuting attorney. If the hearing is held in the county where the defendant 
is confined, notice shall also be given to the prosecuting attorney for that 
county. 
77-15-8. Bail exonerated on commitment of defendant. 
When a defendant awaiting trial is committed to a mental health facility, 
bail shall be exonerated. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
